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Abstract 
 
In May 2017, the government of Brazil enacted a new immigration law, 
replacing a statute introduced in 1980 during the country’s military 
dictatorship with progressive legislation that advances human rights 
principles and adopts innovative approaches to migration management.  
One of the most notable features of the new law is its explicit rejection of 
the criminalization of migration, and its promotion of efforts to regularize 
undocumented migrants.  Although the law itself is new, the values 
embedded in the law reflect recent trends in Brazilian immigration policy, 
which has embraced legalization, and has generally resisted the use of 
criminal law to punish unauthorized migration.  Indeed, in Brazil, an 
initial unlawful entry does not carry criminal consequences, and at the 
level of society, public discourse and policy debates display minimal 
concern regarding this act.  This posture is especially intriguing, given 
Brazil’s otherwise aggressive focus on criminality and incarceration. 
This paper seeks to understand the circumstances that have led to this 
non-embrace of the criminalization of migration, and in particular, the 
scarce use of criminal law tools to punish and deter unlawful entry and 
related acts.  The paper explores how a combination of historical factors, 
present-day conditions, and political forces have largely suppressed 
practices that dominate in the United States and in parts of Europe.  
Contemporary Brazilian immigration policies have generally adopted 
norms of forgiveness and integration—values buoyed by broader 
                                                                                                                                                          
*   Professor of Law and Director, Immigrant Justice Clinic, at American University 
Washington College of Law.  The author was a 2016–17 J. William Fulbright Scholar to Brazil at the 
Universidade de Brasília and the Universidade Estadual da Paraíba, and thanks the Fulbright 
Foundation for the opportunity to pursue this research in Brazil.  Thanks to Daniel McCaskey for his 
exceptional research and editorial assistance and to Cori Alonso-Yoder, Sameer Ashar, Caitlin Barry, 
Bruno Carlucci, João Guilherme Casagrande Granja, Carolina de Abreu B. Claro, Ernie Collette, Laila 
Hlass, Ariadna Estévez López, Jennifer J. Lee, José Maria da Nobrega, Elisa Ortega Velázquez, 
Cristina Pacheco, Jenny Roberts, Gilberto Marcos Antonio Rodrigues, Ragini Shah, Sarah Sherman-
Stokes, Anita Sinha, Juliet Stumpf, Matthew Taylor, Claire Thomas, and Patrick Turner for helpful 
conversations and/or feedback on earlier drafts of this article.  Special thanks to César Cuauhtémoc 
García Hernández for the invitation to participate in this symposium and for his insightful feedback on 
earlier drafts of this article.  Please note that all translations of Portuguese-language sources into 
English, including direct quotes, are my own. 
148  OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 16:147 
geopolitical interests that the Brazilian government has pursued in recent 
times.  Additional factors unique to Brazil undergird the current approach, 
including Brazil’s history of immigration, current migration flows, and 
criminal justice priorities.  The paper concludes with some cautionary 
notes, suggesting that the disavowal of criminalization in Brazil may be 
ephemeral in Brazil’s volatile political climate, and may mask other 
conditions that create structural vulnerability for noncitizens in the 
country. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The world today is experiencing unprecedented levels of global migration, with 
tens of millions of persons living outside of their country of nationality or displaced 
from their homes.1  A number of factors have contributed to these migration flows, 
including entrenched, violent conflicts, varying forms of persecution, climate 
change, economic and food insecurity, and efforts at family reunification.  In recent 
times, some migrant-receiving countries—including the United States and some 
countries in Europe—have sought to enhance immigration enforcement, expel 
unauthorized individuals, and curb the entry of certain noncitizens.2  Among the key 
narratives informing this trend are concerns about criminality among migrants,3 and 
the related concern that migrants—particularly those from certain countries or of 
certain religious or ethnic backgrounds—pose a threat to national security.4  In some 
jurisdictions—most notably the United States—these narratives build upon a 
decades-long trend towards criminalizing migrants, as reflected in a range of well-
established practices.5 
Scholars have explored whether restrictiveness in migration policy is a growing 
and inexorable trend, particularly in an age of global terrorism and the retrenchment 
of nationalism.  While opinions on this question are mixed,6 there is consensus 
regarding the growing criminalization of irregular migrants, including the 
                                                                                                                                                          
1   UNHCR, Figures at a Glance, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html. 
2   See, e.g., Joanna Parkin, The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: A State-of-the-Art of 
the Academic Literature and Research, CEPS PAPER IN LIBERTY & SECURITY No. 61 (Oct. 2013), at 7–
8 (describing restrictive measures introduced in Europe). 
3   See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants Are Not Criminals”: Respectability, Immigration 
Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 701–02 (2016). 
4   Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1850–57 (2007). 
5   CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 9–15 (2015). 
6   See generally Hein de Haas et al., Growing Restrictiveness or Changing Selection?  The 
Nature and Evolution of Migration Policies, INT’L MIGRATION REV. (2016) (arguing that although there 
appears to be a global trend towards more restrictive migration policies, a closer examination of 45 
countries reveals a mixed picture). 
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codification and prosecution of illegal entry and related offenses in the United States 
and Europe.7  There has been comparatively less study, however, regarding the 
criminalization of migration in the Global South.8  This scholarly attention is critical, 
given that some of these countries shoulder a disproportionate burden of the global 
migration flows.9  Additionally, as more countries in Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia embrace their role as migrant-receiving countries, their policies and practices 
merit scrutiny, both for their own sake and as possible counter-examples to what is 
occurring in the United States and Europe.10 
This article examines laws and policies relating to unlawful entry and related 
criminal offenses in one such country: Brazil.  Brazil has an extensive history of 
receiving international migrants, and continues to receive economic migrants and 
refugees from across the globe.11  Brazil is also a country where race and class 
divisions are deeply embedded in societal structures, and where concerns regarding 
criminality in society are heightened and have led to a burgeoning prison 
population.12  In other words, on paper, Brazil seems to be fertile ground for 
embracing criminal-immigration intersections.  As this article explores, however, 
the criminalization and prosecution of immigration-related offenses—in particular, 
unlawful entry—simply has not taken root in Brazil.  In fact, the contrary is arguably 
true, as exemplified by the passage of a new immigration law in May 2017, which 
explicitly embraces the “non-criminalization of migration” as a principle of 
Brazilian immigration policy.13 
                                                                                                                                                          
7   Id. at 25 (“Irregular migrants are the only category for which policies have almost 
consistently moved into a more restrictive direction over the entire post-WWII period.”). 
8   See, e.g., Anugerah Rizki Akbari, Explaining Crimmigration in Indonesia: A Discourse of 
the Fight Against People Smuggling, Irregular Migration Control, and Symbolic Criminalization, 3 
INDONESIA L. REV. 276, 279 (2015) (“discussion concerning [crimmigration in places outside the U.S. 
and Europe] remains dark”). 
9   UNHCR, supra note 1 (noting that the “top hosting countries” for displaced persons are 
Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Uganda, and Ethiopia). 
10  Although not specifically focused on criminalization, some scholars have begun to draw 
distinctions between migration policies in South America, as compared to the U.S. and Europe.  See 
generally Diego Acosta Arcarazo & Luisa Feline Freier, Turning the Immigration Policy Paradox 
Upside Down?  Populist Liberalism and Discursive Gaps in South America, 43 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 
659 (2014). 
11  JEFFREY LESSER, IMMIGRATION, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BRAZIL, 1808 TO THE 
PRESENT (2013) (describing historical migration flows into Brazil); Neide Lopes Patarra, Migrações 
Internacionais de e para o Brasil Contemporâneo: Volumes, Fluxos, Significados e Políticas, 19 SÃO 
PAULO EM PERSPECTIVA 23, 27–31 (2005) (describing more recent migration trends). 
12  Andreia Verdélio, Com 726 mil presos, Brasil tem terceira maior população carcerária do 
mundo, EBC AGÊNCIA BRASIL (Aug. 12, 2017), http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2017-
12/populacao-carceraria-do-brasil-sobe-de-622202-para-726712-pessoas (noting that Brazil now has 
the third largest prison population in the world, behind the United States and China). 
13  Lei No. 13,445 de 24 de Maio de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 25.5.2017. 
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The remainder of this article proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I briefly sketch 
how concern about undocumented migration, and the prosecution of unlawful entry, 
has grown in the United States and elsewhere.  I then describe the landscape of laws 
and practices in Brazil relating to such criminal offenses, noting the conspicuous 
absence of a provision that criminalizes unlawful entry without other aggravating 
factors, and the infrequent use of comparable provisions in the Brazilian criminal 
code.  In Part III, I suggest different ways to understand Brazil’s seeming rejection 
of the criminalization of migration, examining historical, demographic, political, 
and other factors.  I conclude in Part IV with some observations and reflections about 
the normative significance of these policies at the global level, along with some 
cautionary notes about the possible impermanence of Brazil’s current approach. 
 
II. CRIMINALIZING UNLAWFUL ENTRY: THEORY AND COMPARATIVE PRACTICES 
 
The criminalization of migration is a complex phenomenon that takes many 
different forms across diverse jurisdictions.  The most common manifestations 
include: (1) the criminalization of unlawful entry and/or other migration-related acts, 
such as unlawful re-entry, assisting others to enter unlawfully, or harboring; (2) the 
imposition of immigration-related consequences (such as deportation) for criminal 
conviction or even arrests; (3) the contemporary phenomenon of immigration 
detention, including practices that are nominally “civil detention” but are 
indistinguishable from criminal incarceration; and (4) the blurring of lines between 
the functions of local police and immigration officers, including the delegation of 
immigration-related functions to local police.14  This article focuses primarily on the 
first of these, and highlights some competing theoretical approaches, along with 
distinct laws and policies adopted in the United States, Europe, and Brazil.  As 
described more fully below, in the context of increased global scrutiny of irregular 
migration, Brazil has charted a unique course by favoring regularization and safe 
migration over criminalization.  To provide relevant context, other criminal-
immigration intersections in Brazil are also briefly described below. 
 
A. Theoretical Considerations 
 
In a world that remains defined by nation-states, and thus national borders and 
immigration control, there are two primary approaches to unlawful entry: to treat it 
as an administrative violation, with a corresponding immigration law sanction, or to 
criminalize the act, and therefore possibly jail or fine violators. 
If one separates out the current political context, it is difficult to argue that the 
act of crossing a border should intrinsically be treated as a crime.  Most unauthorized 
migration is either forced migration, economic migration, or some combination 
thereof, which suggests that most border-crossers would not have the intent to 
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perpetrate violence or other kinds of harm upon the United States.  This begs the 
question of whether criminal law, which at its core is designed to address socially 
undesirable behavior, should be used to regulate the movement of persons across 
national boundaries.15  The use of criminal law sanctions is especially notable given 
the economic and situational precarity of many individuals who choose to enter other 
countries without authorization.  Indeed, one could reasonably argue that most of 
these individuals would have sought a legitimate visa to enter their destination 
country, if they had the means of doing so and they qualified under an existing visa 
category.16  Finally, criminalization of unlawful entry seems to run counter to the 
longer arc of globalization, which is causing the world to become increasingly 
interdependent economically, and is leading to frequent movements across 
borders.17 
Yet basic tenets of criminology explain how an act such as unlawful entry can 
be converted into a crime, simply by establishing a rule, enforcing the law, and 
imposing a penalty.  The decision to treat a particular act as a crime is often based 
on societal consensus, but it can also reflect the will of a politically powerful subset 
of the population, which seeks to exert or maintain control over others.18  As Ben 
Bowling observed, “What is important is who feels harmed by the act and the power 
of those defining the act as criminal in comparison with those against whom the rule 
is enforced.”19  This is not to suggest that border control is without justification, as 
the entry of noncitizens can certainly carry economic, social, and even security-
related consequences.  From a regulatory perspective, however, the question is 
whether the imposition of a criminal penalty is needed to accomplish specific state 
objectives, or whether an administrative sanction or even no sanction would suffice.  
In answering this question, one must disentangle distinct state objectives relating to 
migrants, which at times coincide, but can also coexist in tension.20 
                                                                                                                                                          
15  Juliet  Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign  Power, 56 AM. 
U. L. REV. 367, 379 (2006). 
16  Daniel Martinez & Jeremy Slack, What Part of “Illegal” Don’t You Understand?  The Social 
Consequences of Criminalizing Unauthorized Mexican Migrants in the United States, 22 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 535, 546. 
17  Ben Bowling, Border Work, Criminology, and the Crimmigration Control Industry, in THE 
BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT: MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 292, 293 (Katja Franko 
Aas & Mary Bosworth eds., 2013). 
18  EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 35–38 (1992). 
19  Bowling, supra note 17, at 292. 
20  In his book chapter on migration control in Spain, José Ángel Brandariz García illustrates 
this precise dynamic, contrasting the rhetoric of criminal expulsion with the country’s need for migrant 
labor.  José Ángel Brandariz García, The Control of Irregular Migrants and the Criminal Law of the 
Enemy, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR 255 (Maria João Guia, 
Maartje Van Der Woude & Joanne Van Der Leun eds., 2013).  See also Maria João Guia, 
Crimmigration, Securitisation, and the Criminal Law of the Crimmigrant, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND 
JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR 18 (Maria João Guia, Maartje Van Der Woude & Joanne 
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While nations have the sovereign authority to control their own borders, the 
imposition of criminal penalties for an irregular entry leads to various adverse 
consequences.  First, it attaches a stigma to migrants and the act of migration itself, 
suggesting that noncitizens pose a kind of danger that must be deterred with the 
imposition of a criminal punishment.21  Indeed, as criminal law ostensibly operates 
to protect society from acts that are considered dangerous and/or socially 
undesirable,22 the prosecution and incarceration of migrants for the mere act of 
crossing a border imbues the undocumented population with presumed criminality 
and moral unworthiness.23  Additionally, the possibility of a criminal sanction leads 
to greater marginalization of undocumented persons, in part due to fear of having 
contact with law enforcement.  This may lead irregular migrants to avoid seeking 
help, even if they themselves are victims of crime.24  Along these lines, this type of 
criminalization may lead migrants to gravitate to underground economies and 
networks, fueling more worrisome forms of criminal activity.25  Furthermore, 
noncitizens who are burdened with a criminal conviction for a migration-related act 
face significant difficulties in seeking lawful status (including permanent residence) 
at some point in the future.26 
The criminalization of unlawful entry has significant adverse consequences for 
racial minorities, and reinforces deeply entrenched racial hierarchies.  Given that 
most of the persons who are charged with illegal entry are persons of color,27 the 
criminalization of the act reifies race-based stereotypes of criminality and 
dangerousness.  César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández and Yolanda Vázquez have 
explored how the history of crimmigration and its present-day iterations in the 
                                                                                                                                                          
Van Der Leun eds., 2013) (noting the “bipolarity in the way the immigrant is perceived . . . on the one 
hand, as a necessary tool for the renovation and sustainability of the State and, on the other hand, as a 
potential enemy whose presence requires a preventive reinforcement of security measures . . . .”). 
21  César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L.  REV. 1457, 
1458 (2013); cf. Amada Armenta, Racializing Crimmigration: Structural Racism, Colorblindness, and 
the Institutional Production of Immigrant Criminality, 3 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 82, 92–93 (2016) 
(describing how contact with the criminal justice system transforms Latino immigrants as “criminal 
aliens”). 
22  Stumpf, supra note 15, at 379. 
23  Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 288 (2017) 
(arguing that the “earned citizenship” frame requires noncitizens to prove their moral worth, and to 
overcome the “original sin” of their initial immigration transgression). 
24  Carmen Lussi, Políticas públicas e desigualdades na migração e refúgio, 26 PSICOLOGÍA 
USP 136, 140 (2015). 
25  Martinez & Slack, supra note 16, at 540. 
26  Id. 
27  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNING MIGRANTS INTO CRIMINALS: THE HARMFUL 
IMPACT OF US BORDER PROSECUTIONS (2013) (“88 percent of defendants convicted of immigration 
offenses in 2012 were Hispanic . . . .”). 
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United States are shaped by animus towards racial minorities, disguised as objective 
legal norms.28  Even in the absence of explicit animus on the part of individual 
actors, the practices of the criminal-immigration system may be guided by implicit 
bias or structural racism that leads certain groups to be disproportionately affected.29  
Indeed, in the current political moment, racial difference, combined with economic 
vulnerability, make undocumented racial minorities easy targets for government 
officials who wish to demonstrate that they are “tough” on immigration.30 
 
B. Policies in Comparative Perspective 
 
Some countries treat unauthorized entry as a crime, situating it within a suite of 
offenses that includes illegal reentry, the smuggling of migrants, or otherwise aiding 
and abetting an unlawful entry.31  In the United States, illegal entry first became a 
crime in 1929.32  Initially, the misdemeanor of unlawful entry was punishable by a 
year in prison and/or a fine of $1,000, and a subsequent unlawful entry could be 
prosecuted as a felony.33  In the present day, U.S. law continues to treat an initial 
illegal entry, or “improper entry by [an] alien” as a misdemeanor.34  The U.S. Code 
separately criminalizes “reentry of removed aliens,” imposing heightened penalties 
upon persons who re-enter (or seek to do so) after being previously removed.35  To 
be sure, entry without authorization is not always treated as a crime under U.S. law, 
since immigration officers may simply charge the individual with an administrative 
violation of immigration law and commence removal proceedings,36 without 
referring the matter to federal prosecutors.  Europe has largely followed the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                          
28  See generally García Hernández, supra note 21; Yolanda Vazquez, Constructing 
Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 599 (2015). 
29  Doris Marie Provine & Roxanne Lynn Doty, The Criminalization of Immigrants as a Racial 
Project, 27 J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUSTICE 261, 266 (2011). 
30  Id. 
31  Lussi, supra note 24, at 140. 
32  Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 299 
(2010). 
33  Stephen E. Gunkel & Ana-María González Wahl, Unauthorized Migrants and the (Il)Logic 
of “Crime Control”: A Human Rights Perspective on the US Federal and Local State Immigration 
Policies, 6 SOC. COMPASS 26, 28 (2012). 
34  8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). 
35  8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012). 
36  Specifically, the noncitizen could be charged as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as being present without admission or parole, and thus subject to removal proceedings. 
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model, with at least 17 of the European Union member states treating irregular 
border crossings or irregular stays as a criminal offense.37 
In recent years, however, the United States has (ignominiously) distinguished 
itself with its aggressive pursuit of federal prosecutions of immigration-related 
crimes.38  A coordinated campaign among federal prosecutors and immigration 
agents—named Operation Streamline—has led to robust prosecutions for unlawful 
entry in key border areas.39  In Fiscal Year 2013, for example, close to 50,000 Border 
Patrol apprehensions were referred for prosecution pursuant to Operation 
Streamline.40  In Fiscal Year 2016, 68,314 defendants were prosecuted for 
immigration crimes before federal judges, representing 43 percent of all persons 
prosecuted in that year for federal criminal offenses.41  These practices have faced 
significant criticism, even from federal judges who are required to impose jail 
sentences on migrants who violate these laws, but who question the overall efficacy 
of the initiative.42 
Brazilian law, by contrast, does not treat an initial unlawful entry as a criminal 
offense, but rather classifies the act as an administrative violation that can lead to 
deportation from the country.43  This approach is somewhat surprising, given the 
circumstances that gave rise to earlier legislation in the country.  The statute that 
preceded the 2017 Lei de Migração (Migration Law), the Estatuto do Estrangeiro 
(Foreigner’s Statute) was introduced in 1980, during Brazil’s military dictatorship.44  
The law imposed significant restrictions on foreigners, placing them in a position of 
                                                                                                                                                          
37  Parkin, supra note 2, at 7. 
38  Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 
139–40 (2009); García Hernández, supra note 21, at 1472–73. 
39  See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
STREAMLINE: MEASURING ITS EFFECT ON ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING (2015). 
40  Id. at 6. 
41  Immigration Continues Lead Role in Federal Convictions, CRIMMIGRATION (Mar. 28, 2017), 
http://crimmigration.com/2017/03/28/immigration-continues-lead-role-in-federal-criminal-
prosecutions/. 
42  JOANNA LYDGATE, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE 4–7 
(2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf. 
43  Christian Gomes Bezerra dos Santos, A Criminalização da Imigração Irregular e os Direitos 
Humanos, Os Casos Específicos de Brasil e Itália, 9 REVISTA DA FARN 101, 107 (2010).  Notably, 
proposed changes to the Brazilian criminal code would add various other immigration-related crimes.  
Projeto de Lei do Senado no. 236, de 2012 (Novo Código Penal), arts. 452–57.   These proposals have 
been pending in the Brazilian Congress for several years, and have not gained political traction.  
Moreover, aspects of the new immigration law—including the provision that rejects criminalization—
would legally undermine any efforts to impose a criminal penalty for unlawful entry. 
44  Marcia Anita Sprandel, Migração e Crime: A Lei 6.815 de 1980, 12 REVISTA 
INTERDISCIPLINARIA DA MOBILIDADE HUMANA 145 (2015). 
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inequality on issues of fundamental human rights.45  That law, by its very terms, 
viewed immigration law as an instrument of national security, and sought to prevent 
the entry of potentially subversive elements into Brazilian society.46  In other words, 
the law strongly implied that foreigners were a potential threat to domestic 
security.47  For that reason, the law prohibited noncitizens from engaging in political 
activity in Brazil, including low-level actions such as attending demonstrations.48 
Despite the context of its enactment, the 1980 law avoided criminalizing 
unlawful entry, as practiced by the United States.  Over the years, however, Brazil 
has incorporated provisions that criminalize certain migration-related acts.  For 
example, Brazilian law imposes criminal penalties on individuals who assist others 
to enter unlawfully, and imposes a penalty on individuals who seek to re-enter the 
country surreptitiously after expulsion from Brazil.49  The principal immigration-
related crimes in Brazil are presented in the table below. 
 
 
Table: Immigration-Related Crimes in Brazilian Law 
 
Code Provision Crime Penalty 
Article 338, Criminal 
Code 
Re-entry into the national 
territory of a foreigner 
who had been expelled 
Imprisonment from 1–4 
years, with the possibility 
of a subsequent expulsion 
after the sentence has 
been served 
Article 309, Criminal 
Code 
Use by a foreigner of a 
false name in order to 
enter or remain in the 
national territory; 
attribution of a false 
Imprisonment from 1–3 
years, plus a fine; 
Imprisonment from 1–4 
years, plus a fine 
                                                                                                                                                          
45  Luiz Orencio Figueredo & João Henrique Zanelatto, Legislação e políticas públicas voltadas 
à imigração no Brasil, 8 PASSAGENS: REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE HISTÓRIA POLÍTICA E CULTURA 
JURÍDICA 252, 262 (2016). 
46  Id. at 147; Márcio Adriano Anselmo, Crimigração: A criminalização do estrangeiro no 
Brasil e seus efeitos, 50 REVISTA DE INFORMAÇÃO LEGISLATIVA 143, 148 (2013). 
47  Camila Lissa Asano & Pétalla Brandão Timo, A nova Lei de Migração no Brasil e os direitos 
humanos, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG BRASIL (Apr. 17, 2017), https://br.boell.org/pt-
br/2017/04/17/nova-lei-de-migracao-no-brasil-e-os-direitos-humanos.  Along these lines, the 1980 law 
limited the ability of foreigners to affiliate with unions and to participate in public demonstrations.  Id.  
See also Mateus de Oliveira Fornasier & Maiquel Angelo Dezordi Wermuth, Autoritarismo Versus 
Redemocratização: Do Imigrante No Brasil, 15 REVISTA JURÍDICA CESUMAR 399, 405 (2015). 
48  Lei no. 6,815 de 1980 (Estatuto do Estrangeiro), Art. 106, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 21.8.1980. 
49  Gomes Bezerra dos Santos, supra note 43, at 106. 
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characteristic to a 
foreigner in order to 
promote his or her entry 
into the national territory 
Article 232A, Criminal 
Code (introduced by 
2017 law) 
Promote, by any means, 
with the goal of 
obtaining an economic 
benefit, the illegal entry 
of a foreigner into the 
national territory or of a 
Brazilian national into a 
foreign country, or the 
departure of a foreigner 
from the national 
territory in order to 
illegally enter a foreign 
country    
 
Imprisonment from 2–5 
years, plus a fine, with 
aggravating factors that 
can enhance a sentence 
Article 125, Law 6815 
of 1980 (Estatuto do 
Estrangeiro) (recently 
repealed, with passage 
in 2017 of Lei de 
Migração) 
 
Smuggle or harbor 
foreigners; make a false 
declaration in the process 
of visa processing, 
registration, alteration of 
settlements, 
naturalization, or when 
obtaining a passport for 
foreigners, laissez-
passer, or, when 
required, exit visa; 
violations of other 
restrictions on the 
conduct of foreigners, 
including engagement in 
political activity 
Imprisonment from 1–5 
years and, if the offender 
is a foreigner, expulsion  
 
Under Brazilian law, the Polícia Federal (Federal Police) has jurisdiction to 
investigate these crimes and to refer them for prosecution before the federal courts.50  
On paper, these offenses appear to mirror similar offenses that exist under U.S. law.  
A critical distinction, however, is the negligible numbers of prosecutions under 
Brazilian law.  During a recent five-year period, there were only 129 total police 
investigations for violations of Criminal Code Article 309, and 109 investigations 
                                                                                                                                                          
50  Anselmo, supra note 46, at 151. 
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of possible violations of Article 308.51  To put this figure in context, in a year when 
nearly 6 million foreigners entered Brazil, fewer than 100 individuals were even 
investigated for using a false name or attempting to re-enter after expulsion.52  And 
to provide additional context for the scope of immigration enforcement operations 
in Brazil, in 2017 Brazil expelled just 375 noncitizens due to criminal convictions.53  
In 2016, the Federal Police effectuated only 79 expulsions, along with 147 
deportations and 143 repatriations.54 
Brazil’s already limited appetite for the prosecution of immigration-related 
crimes was nearly extinguished in May 2017, when the 1980 law was repealed and 
a new immigration law was enacted.  An immediate difference is noticeable in the 
title, which replaces the more alienating “Estatuto do Estrangeiro” (Foreigner’s 
Statute) with the more neutral “Lei de Migração” (Migration Law).55  A critical 
provision of the new law is Article 3, which articulates principles that guide Brazil’s 
migration policy, including the “non-criminalization of migration.”56  Consistent 
with this value, the new law requires administrative authorities to notify irregular 
migrants about the possibility of regularizing, and specifies that authorities must 
permit 60 days for irregular migrants to do so.57  In practice, this requires the 
government to create conditions or mechanisms that would allow migrants to obtain 
documents, instead of reflexively insisting on immigration documentation and 
punishing those who lack them.58  The new law also repealed Article 125 of the 1980 
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22311551. 
54  POLÍCIA FEDERAL, UNIDADE PRESTADORA DE CONTAS, RELATÓRIO DE GESTÃO DO EXERCÍCIO 
DE 2016 (2017).  Under Brazilian law, deportação (deportation) applies to persons who enter or remain 
in irregular status; repatriação (repatriation) is similar to deportation, but is typically effectuated at a 
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Santos, supra note 43, at 108. 
55  Lei No. 13.445, de 24 de maio de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 25.5.2017; 
see also Natália Araújo, Avanços e desafios da nova Lei de Migração, CARTA CAPITAL (April 27, 2017), 
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56  Lei No. 13.445, de 24 de Maio de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 25.5.2017.  
Other notable principles in this article include “repudiation and provision of xenophobia, racism, and 
any other form of discrimination,” “humanitarian protection,” “guarantee of the right to family 
reunification,” “equality of treatment and opportunity for the migrant and their relatives,” “equal access 
for the migrant to services, programs, and social benefits, public goods, education, holistic public legal 
representation, work, housing, banking services, and social security,” and “repudiation of practices of 
collective expulsion or deportation.”  Id. 
57  Lei No. 13.445, de 24 de Maio de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 25.5.2017. 
58  Araújo, supra note 55. 
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law, which imposed criminal penalties for a range of immigration-related conduct, 
including smuggling or harboring foreigners, and making a false statement in 
various immigration-related processes.59  In its stead, the 2017 law introduced 
Article 232A to the Brazilian Criminal Code, a more general provision relating to 
the promotion of illegal entry for economic benefit.60  In these various regards, the 
new immigration law in Brazil stands in stark contrast to the policies in other 
countries, which have prioritized criminalization and deportation, as opposed to 
regularization.61 
 
C. Other Criminal-Immigration Intersections in Brazil 
 
Although the focus of this article is on Brazil’s treatment of unlawful entry, 
some discussion of other criminal-immigration intersections provides context for 
understanding the relevant legal and policy landscape. 
Brazilian law does allow an expulsion process to commence if a non-citizen 
commits a crime of sufficient gravity.  Unlike the United States, which has 
established a dizzying matrix of criminal removal categories, Brazilian law remains 
somewhat vague regarding the types of crimes that can lead to expulsion, simply 
noting that the “seriousness and the possibility of resocialization into the national 
territory” is the relevant consideration.62  Additionally, even if a noncitizen has a 
criminal conviction, Brazilian law forbids expulsion if the noncitizen has a spouse 
residing in Brazil, a dependent child who is a Brazilian national, or if the noncitizen 
arrived in Brazil before the age of 12 and has resided in the country since that time.63  
The law also provides discretionary protection for noncitizens who are at least 70 
years of age, and who have lived in the country for more than 10 years.64  These 
provisions reveal that Brazilian law is more forgiving than its U.S. analog. 
Additionally, unlike in the United States, noncitizens who serve time in custody 
are not funneled automatically into the immigration removal system.65  Nor is there 
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60  Lei No. 13.445, de 24 de Maio de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 25.5.2017. 
61  Diego Acosta, Brazil’s New Migration Law: A Huge Step Forward for Migrant Rights 
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forward-for-migrant-rights-protection/. 
62  Lei No. 13.445, de 24 de Maio de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 25.5.2017. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Paula Adamo Ideota, Condenados estrangeiros vivem limbo no Brasil ao sair da prisão, BBC 
BRASIL (May 13, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2015/05/150507_presos_estrangeiros_limbo_pai (describing 
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a comprehensive effort to track down noncitizens with past convictions that could 
potentially lead to expulsion.  Although some number of these noncitizens are 
ultimately expelled from the country, many are simply released from criminal 
custody after serving their sentence.66  This dynamic is telling, since a singular law 
enforcement agency—the Federal Police—handles both routine criminal 
investigations and also the enforcement of federal immigration laws.  Thus far, 
however, the Federal Police have not prioritized immigration enforcement as part of 
their functions.67 
Immigration detention is a theoretical possibility, but does not exist in practice 
in any systematic way.  Under Brazilian law, the Federal Police may detain an 
individual in order to effectuate their removal from Brazil.68  In reality, very few 
immigrants are detained by the Federal Police, and there are no detention centers 
exclusively for immigrants, such as those that exist in the U.S. and other countries.69  
On the contrary, when noncitizens are detained by the Federal Police in order to 
effectuate a return to their country of origin, they are typically held in ad hoc spaces 
at the airport.70  While immigration detention is nearly nonexistent, as described 
more fully below, Brazil has embraced incarceration in its criminal justice system, 
as reflected in a large and growing prison population.71 
Finally, because many law enforcement functions are concentrated in the 
Federal Police, the concerns about “blurring of the lines” between distinct law 
enforcement entities are not prominent in Brazil.  Moreover, there are no initiatives 
to delegate immigration functions to local authorities or law enforcement agencies.  
One might argue, however, that the multiple functions handled by the Federal Police 
(including immigration matters) could undermine trust with the public, particularly 
those who are not Brazilian citizens.  As noted above, however, the Federal Police 
engages in minimal immigration enforcement. 
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Overall, a review of these criminal-immigration intersections in Brazil presents 
a fairly benign picture.  While federal authorities have the capacity to criminalize 
migrants, they have done so infrequently.  Moreover, the new immigration law 
seems to signal a clear departure from criminalization.  As with any new legislation, 
however, it remains to be seen exactly how the new, progressive norms will be 
interpreted, both by the Executive Branch (which issued implementing regulations 
for the law in late 2017)72 and by the Federal Police, who are charged with various 
immigration-related functions. 
 
III. THE NON-CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION IN BRAZIL: 
UNPACKING ITS ORIGINS 
 
On the surface, the criminal-immigration policies in Brazil appear to represent 
a significant departure from practices in the U.S. and in parts of Europe.  In 
particular, the explicit rejection of the criminalization of migrants is a counterpoint 
to the burgeoning “crimmigration” nexus elsewhere.  Additionally, the lackluster 
enforcement of immigration laws is notable, when compared to the growing 
enforcement budgets in other countries.  Advocates for the human rights of migrants 
might be inclined to commend Brazil for its seemingly humanitarian approach.  A 
closer examination reveals a more complex picture, and suggests that a range of 
factors (themselves multi-layered) may have contributed to the current set of 
policies. 
 
A. Geopolitical Considerations 
 
Brazil’s current approach to the criminalization of migration can be explained, 
in part, through an examination of the country’s broader geopolitical objectives.  The 
relatively beneficent approach to migration control helps position Brazil as a 
distinctive and independent global voice, and a leader among countries in the Global 
South and in South America in particular.  Moreover, the explicit embrace of the 
human rights of migrants allows Brazil to elevate its profile within the United 
Nations system, and to advocate effectively for the large number of Brazilian 
émigrés residing in North America, Europe, and parts of Latin America.  As both a 
migrant-sending and migrant-receiving country, under recent presidents Brazil has 
sought to adopt policies consistent with its own expectations for how Brazilian 
nationals should be treated overseas. 
Migration-related policies are often shaped by foreign relations objectives, 
whether that goal is to forge stronger ties or to discredit adversaries, or to achieve 
some other strategic, political, or ideological objective vis-à-vis other countries.73  
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In some cases, the receiving country’s objective is to modify or repair its own 
reputation, thereby strengthening its position within the international community.74 
Brazil’s non-embrace of criminalization can be understood, in part, through this 
lens.  In addition to the new immigration law with its progressive norms, Brazil has 
adopted other progressive measures in recent years relating to the humanitarian 
protection of migrants.  Most notably, Brazil has issued special humanitarian visas 
to Haitians who wish to migrate to Brazil, and also to persons affected by the conflict 
in Syria.75  Unlike other migrant-receiving countries, which have sought to block or 
disincentivize refugee flows, Brazil has adopted a more flexible approach that 
promotes regular entry.  This allows Brazil to position itself as a regional and global 
leader on issues of migration,76 and to strengthen its credentials relating to human 
rights and humanitarian protection.77 
The progressive posture has allowed Brazil to stake a contrary position on a 
key global issue, and to launch critiques, when it so desires, against wealthier 
countries.  For example, in 2009, during the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva 
(“Lula”), Brazil offered an amnesty to tens of thousands of undocumented persons 
in the country.78  On the same day that the amnesty was announced, Lula asked his 
Ministry of Justice to raise the issue before the G8, “[in order] to show the leaders 
of those large economies Brazil’s disagreement with the policies of the rich with 
respect to immigrants. . . . Work and dignity for the immigrant is the response that 
Brazil gives to the intolerance of the wealthy countries.”79  Through these discourses, 
Brazil has implicitly sought to advance a distinct position on migration for the 
Global South, and to serve as the leader for that counter-position.  During Lula’s 
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ilegal, O ESTADO DE S. PAULO (July 2, 2009), http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lula-
sanciona-lei-que-anistia-estrangeiros-em-situacao-ilegal,396948). 
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presidency, Brazil also created a Special Secretariat for Human Rights, linked to the 
Office of the President, and continued to strengthen its internal human rights 
infrastructure.80  In 2009, Brazil signed the International Convention on the Rights 
of Migrant Workers and their Families, and in the course of ratifying the instrument, 
the Minister of External Relations noted the context of “increasingly severe entry 
restrictions” and the corresponding need to strengthen efforts to protect the human 
rights of migrants.81 
This leadership on human rights issues is an important predicate for Brazil’s 
ascension as a global power.  Brazil has long been on the cusp of being a major 
political force; the country has one of the largest economies in the world, 
consistently ranking among the top ten in terms of gross domestic product.82  
Already a member of the BRICS alliance (comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa), Brazil has the potential to be an even more influential global 
player.83  Additionally, its warmer embrace of migrants from other countries allows 
Brazil to strengthen connections with other regions of the world, particularly South-
South relationships.  The openings provided by a more flexible immigration policy 
may also generate longer-term economic and political benefits for Brazil.84 
Furthermore, by embracing a more inclusive approach to migration—one 
informed by human rights principles—Brazil may be seen as an emerging leader 
within the community of nations, and can position itself for seats on prestigious 
United Nations bodies, including the Security Council.  This distinctive approach to 
migration also helps lift Brazil’s reputation in the Inter-American System.  In the 
weeks after the passage of the new immigration law, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights issued a press release praising the new measure, 
describing it as “modern legislation consistent with the principles of [Brazil’s] 
Federal Constitution” and noting the measures that facilitate the regularization of 
migrants.85  The communication also includes a quote from Luis Ernesto Vargas 
Silva, a member of the Commission and its rapporteur on the rights of migrants, who 
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congratulated Brazil for its “important advance for the protection of migrant 
persons . . . .”86 
To be sure, the Presidency of Michel Temer has generated uncertainty about 
the trajectory of Brazil’s foreign policy.  Although the Temer administration has 
emphasized its embrace of “universal themes” such as peace and security,87 others 
have criticized Temer’s foreign policy as regressive, citing a move away from South-
South relationships and a lost opportunity to help mediate the conflict in 
Venezuela.88  In the specific area of human rights, perspectives similarly diverge.89  
With respect to migration, the Temer government has been tested by the arrival of 
thousands of Venezuelans refugees.  Notwithstanding internal political pressures 
and resource challenges, the Temer administration has publicly stated that it will not 
close its doors to the Venezuelans.90  In this regard, the current government has 
reaffirmed the importance of humanitarian migration policies. 
Apart from managing these arriving migrants, Brazil is also justifiably 
concerned about protecting its nationals overseas.  Recent estimates suggest that 
there are approximately 3 million Brazilian nationals who are residing outside of the 
country.91  Beginning in the 1990s, these overseas Brazilians began to organize and 
demand support from the state, which no doubt was cognizant of their economic and 
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See also MILESI & ANDRADE, supra note 78, at 7. 
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electoral power.92  This ultimately led to the creation of an infrastructure within the 
Brazilian government to attend to matters relating to émigrés.93  Scholars have 
argued that Brazil’s adoption of more liberal immigration policies can be explained 
by this large Brazilian emigrant population residing in the United States and in 
Europe.94  One of the primary complaints registered by Brazilians overseas is the 
lack of documentation.95  Some of these migrants have experienced harsh 
immigration enforcement tactics and criminalization in foreign countries; for 
example, between 2002 and 2008, more than 37,000 Brazilians were deported back 
to Brazil, primarily from the United States.96  As noted above, the Brazilian 
government has criticized wealthier countries’ treatment of migrants.  Given its 
concern regarding the experiences of Brazilian emigrants, it would be hypocritical 
for Brazil to adopt the same oppressive practices.97  Therefore, by rejecting 
criminalization, Brazil is in a stronger position to criticize the practices of other 
countries and to safeguard the well-being of its nationals overseas.98 
 
B. The Size and Scope of Migration Flows to Brazil 
 
One factor that necessarily shapes a country’s migration-related policies are the 
nature and size of its incoming migrant flows.  Brazil does receive a significant 
number of foreigners each year: in 2016, the Federal Police recorded the entry of 
nearly 5.9 million noncitizens.99  Compared to the United States and some countries 
in Europe, however, the relative presence of migrants is smaller.  Brazil’s overall 
population is approximately 206 million persons, and it is estimated that there are 
about 1.2 million migrants in the country—less than 1% of the population.100  
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Moreover, although economic growth in Brazil made it attractive for migrants 
several years ago, recent challenges have diminished Brazil’s appeal as a destination 
for labor migration.101  Brazil has experienced an uptick in refugee flows, and in 
recent years, received approximately 30,000 asylum applications per year; prior to 
2011, the country received only about 1,000 asylum applications annually.102  
Compare this to the United States, where well over 100,000 asylum applications are 
docketed each year.103 
Additionally, while estimates regarding the undocumented population in Brazil 
are unreliable, one study from 2010 estimated that population to be in the range of 
around 200,000 persons.104  A 2008 source quoted an official government estimate 
of 180,000, and contrasted that figure to a 600,000 estimate provided by an advocacy 
organization.105  Given the aforementioned economic downturn, it is likely that the 
current undocumented population in Brazil is closer to the lower end of that range. 
Policy makers in the United States face a much larger unauthorized population, 
in the range of 11–14 million persons.  To be sure, restrictive migration policies do 
not necessarily correlate with larger (or specific) numbers of foreigners, given the 
complex historical and sociological factors—including questions of race—that 
shape responses to migrants.106  Nevertheless, it is interesting to contemplate 
whether criminalization of migration could surface in Brazil, should significantly 
increased migration flows introduce changes or exert other pressures on the 
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country.107  Alternatively, one could argue that an ex ante set of conditions, 
objectives, or values relating to international migration (including those described 
in this article) could mitigate or prevent such tensions.  Brazil is poised to be a 
perfect case study, because it is likely to face growing migrant streams in the future, 
and has just recently chosen to reject the criminalization of migrants. 
Although the overall presence of migrants is smaller compared to other 
countries, the incoming international migration flows are nevertheless significant 
and visible in large cities, where migrants tend to be concentrated.  São Paulo and 
surrounding areas have attracted migrants from across the globe, and other cities and 
towns, particularly those near borders or ports of entry, have become host to 
significant numbers of foreigners.108  In urban centers, there are ongoing 
conversations about services for migrant communities and best practices for 
integration.109  Large cities, especially São Paulo, also wield immense political and 
legislative influence, which would suggest that serious grievances about migration 
could be addressed through law reform, including the imposition of criminal 
penalties for irregular migration.  Legislators from urban areas generally supported 
the new law, and have not advocated for this approach—perhaps because the 
migration flows have not triggered significant public concern.  In fact, the legislator 
who formally introduced the new law was Aloysio Nunes Ferreira,110 an influential 
senator from São Paulo who Temer appointed to serve as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.111 
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C. A History of Flexible and Integrative Policies, Informed by Civil Society 
 
Brazil’s current approach to irregular migration is likely conditioned by a 
legacy of migration-related policies in the country’s history, which evidence a 
flexible and integrative approach to migration management.  A key piece of this 
history is the country’s relatively frequent embrace of legalization initiatives.  Since 
1980, the Brazilian government has approved four separate laws that allow for the 
“regularization” of undocumented migrants in the country.  These “amnesties” were 
conferred in 1981, 1988, 1998, and 2009.112  In the aggregate, they allowed for the 
regularization of nearly 150,000 migrants.113  According to observers, a range of 
factors affected participation in these processes, including lack of confidence or trust 
on the part of the migrants, as well as bureaucratic hurdles such as required 
paperwork and deadlines.114 
Another factor that explains the more flexible approach to irregular migration 
is Brazil’s engagement with its regional neighbors in coordinating migration 
policies.115  One of the longer-term objectives of these partnerships is the right to 
free circulation for migrants within the region.116  Under the terms of the 2002 
Mercosur Residence Agreement, which went into effect in 2009, nationals of 
Mercosur Member States (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and soon 
Bolivia)117 and Associate Member States (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, 
and Suriname) are permitted to reside and work in another member state for a period 
of two years, provided they can establish their citizenship and demonstrate a clean 
criminal record.118  After two years, the permit holder may seek lawful permanent 
residence in the host country.119  Brazil also may have been influenced by similar 
pieces of progressive migration legislation that were enacted in Argentina (2004) 
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and Ecuador (2008).120  Although both of these measures encountered significant 
challenges,121 they are emblematic of a consistent regional effort to stake out a more 
accommodating approach to migration.  This flexibility involving regional migrants 
likely shapes the government’s posture towards unlawful entry, since the Mercosur 
Agreement provides yet another pathway to regularization. 
This more flexible and integrative posture towards migrants is also explained, 
in part, through the active engagement of civil society actors in immigration policy 
discussions and decision-making.  For example, Brazil’s National Council on 
Immigration has representatives from civil society,122 as does its National 
Committee on Refugees, which makes decisions on refugee claims.123  In the lead-
up to the passage of the new immigration law, key civil society organizations 
advocated before both the Brazilian government and international bodies, 
emphasizing the human right to migrate.124  Along with representatives of 
government agencies, these civil society organizations participated in conversations 
regarding themes for the new law and possible provisions to include.  Over many 
years, the Brazilian government has allowed these entities to have a meaningful role 
in migration-related decision making.  The migrant-friendly values they advocate 
have unquestionably shaped the recent trajectory of Brazilian immigration policy. 
 
D. Historical Considerations, National Identity, and Race 
 
As mentioned, the 1980 law positioned noncitizens as potentially subversive 
elements within Brazilian society.  In a way, that law ran counter to a deep historical 
current: Brazil’s self-conception as a country of immigrants.125  Throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Brazil received waves of migrants, largely from 
Europe (including Germany, Italy, and Poland), Asia (particularly Japan and Korea), 
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and other parts of Latin America.126  The Brazilian government affirmatively 
welcomed (and even recruited) many of these groups of migrants, for different 
purposes.  For example, Brazil sought out migrants to settle more rural areas of its 
territory, and needed a labor force after the end of slavery in the late 19th century.  In 
the post-independence history of Brazil, immigrants have been hailed for 
“improving an imperfect nation” through their presence and contributions.127  Over 
the years, this self-conception of a nation improved by immigrants has remained 
strong, and arguably shapes immigration policy decisions and the nation’s level of 
tolerance to immigrants.128  Indeed, even persons not born abroad often embrace 
their ancestral heritage.129 
Perhaps the most relevant historical factor, however, is the 1980 migration law, 
which explicitly linked migration and national security.  As noted above, this 
foundational immigration law emerged during Brazil’s military dictatorship, and 
sought to undercut potentially subversive influences on Brazil.  Since emerging from 
this military dictatorship, Brazil has made efforts (seen in various aspects of its legal 
system) to counter the legacy of the military dictatorship by explicitly embracing 
human rights norms.130  Although some governmental institutions have been slow to 
change, many within government and civil society are committed to the project of 
constructing a society guided by human rights norms.  This impulse—of eliminating 
the remnants of the military dictatorship—is embedded in progressive law reform 
efforts in Brazil.131  A perfect example is the new immigration law, which was 
framed as a way to undo another legacy of the military dictatorship.  As one pair of 
observers has noted, the establishment of a new legal framework will allow Brazil 
to repay the historical debt occasioned by the more restrictive 1980 law.132  In an 
effort to promote more inclusive governance, law reform efforts now also include 
voices from civil society; as noted above, these representatives have also had a 
                                                                                                                                                          
126 MILESI & ANDRADE, supra note 78, at 4–5 (noting that between 1836 and 1968, the largest 
numbers of migrants to Brazil came from Portugal, Italy, Spain, Germany, Japan, and Russia). 
127 LESSER, supra note 11, at 2. 
128 Agnieszka Zogata-Kusz, Theoretical Perspectives on Immigration Policy and Politics, 1 
CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES 5, 8 (2012). 
129 LESSER, supra note 11, at 2–3. 
130 The 1998 Constitution of Brazil placed international law, including international human 
rights norms, on equal footing with domestic law.  Constitução da República Federativa do Brasil de 
1988, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. 
131 Rafael Lamera Giesta Cabral, Reforma das Instituições para a Democracia e o Legado 
Autoritário: A Branda Justiça de Transição no Brasil, 22 REVISTA DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS & 
DEMOCRACIA 84, 89 (2017) (“the reform of institutions for democracy [is] key to understanding the 
Brazilian phenomenon”). 
132 Deisy Ventura & Rossana Rocha Reis, Criação de lei de migrações é divida histórica do 
Brasil, CARTA CAPITAL (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/divida-historica-
uma-lei-de-migracoes-para-o-brasil-9419.html. 
170  OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 16:147 
moderating influence on criminalization tendencies, by reinforcing the importance 
of human rights. 
To be sure, Brazil’s self-conception as an immigrant nation is deeply informed 
by questions of race and class.  In the 19th century, the Brazilian government 
affirmatively recruited European migrants in order to “whiten” society given the 
large numbers of slaves who had recently been emancipated.133  Even among Asian 
migrants, Japanese migrants were welcomed, whereas Chinese migrants were turned 
away due to racialized and class-based conceptions of inferiority.134  Although Brazil 
received migrants from the Middle East throughout the 20th century, and some 
experienced discrimination,135 many have assimilated within Brazil’s racial 
hierarchy as “white.”  (For example, Brazil’s embattled president, Michel Temer, is 
the son of Lebanese immigrants who immigrated to Brazil in 1925).136 
International migration flows to Brazil are undergoing a demographic shift, 
such that many of the present-day migrants hail from the Global South, including 
Haiti, Senegal, the Congo, Bolivia, and other countries.137  This stands in contrast to 
Brazilian policies from the early twentieth century, which effectively denied entry 
to Black migrants, including Black Americans.138  The current migration pathway 
between Haiti and Brazil is particularly strong, and can be traced to Brazil’s 
contribution to the UN effort in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.139  This led to 
stronger ties between the two countries and growing migration flows.  Eventually, 
Brazil’s National Council on Immigration issued resolutions, authorizing the 
issuance of “humanitarian visas” for Haitian nationals, and regularizing those 
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Haitians who had entered the country surreptitiously.140  As of 2016, approximately 
80,000 Haitian nationals were residing in Brazil,141 though a significant number have 
left in recent years, seeking opportunities elsewhere. 
Brazil has an immensely complex history of race relations, but the 
subordination of Black Brazilians has been a consistent thread in Brazilian history.142  
As these migration flows from the Global South persist, and as Black migrants 
continue to arrive in the country, they may test Brazil’s immigrant-friendly identity 
and its apparent tolerance of irregular migration.  Stated differently: is Brazil truly 
welcoming of all migrants, or does it want only migrants of a particular color or 
socioeconomic class?  Migrants from Africa and even some from other parts of Latin 
America have experienced prejudice, discrimination, and exploitative working 
conditions, and have been the target of anti-immigrant public protests.143  Some of 
these migrants have limited professional qualifications and difficulty with the 
language, making them even more susceptible to mistreatment.144  Black migrants 
in Brazil have even suffered physical assaults (including shootings) motivated by 
xenophobia.145 
The experience of these migrants of color in the coming years will shed light 
on the outer bounds of Brazil’s immigrant-friendly identity.  Should the Brazilian 
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state wish to limit the entry of certain migrants of color—or exert control over those 
already in the country—criminalization may resurface as a possibility.146 
 
E. Criminal Justice Priorities in Brazil 
 
Another way to understand Brazil’s non-embrace of migrant criminalization is 
to examine the country’s criminal justice system itself.  Violence and public security 
are top priorities, and law enforcement resources are directed at curbing that 
epidemic.  Although noncitizens have been the subject of criminal prosecutions, the 
vast majority of them entered the criminal justice system through the drug trade.  To 
the extent there are concerns about immigrant criminality in Brazil, they appear to 
be linked to the role that noncitizens play in transporting narcotics. 
In recent decades, Brazil has struggled with the growing influence of criminal 
organizations, particularly in large urban centers such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, 
Belo Horizonte, and Recife.  Crime consistently ranks as the most pressing public 
concern.147  Fear of crime is omnipresent, leading to public support for harsh, 
sometimes illegal responses.148 
Societal violence, one of the principal sequelae of this criminal activity, is now 
seen as a significant public health challenge for Brazil—one that produces physical 
injuries, psychological harm, and diminished quality of life.149  Brazil’s epidemic of 
violence has also resulted in staggering economic costs, in the form of “expenditure 
on police, prisons, private security, public health, and loss of human capital [as well 
as] personal loss from robbery and theft . . . .”150  These deeply entrenched concerns 
about public violence and insecurity within communities have led to heightened 
criminal penalties, robust law enforcement efforts and therefore a growing prison 
population in nearly all Brazilian states.151  Official statistics from summer 2016 
revealed that Brazil had more than 726,000 prisoners, which corresponds to nearly 
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353 prisoners for every 100,000 persons.152  This means that Brazil has the third 
largest prison population in the world, behind the United States and China.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Brazil’s robust crime-fighting efforts have disproportionately 
affected poor communities of color, particularly Afro-descendants.  More than half 
of Brazil’s prison population is comprised of young adults between the ages of 18 
and 29, and 64 percent of prisoners are black.153  The size of this prison population 
and the disproportionate impact on underprivileged minorities is yet another reason 
why Brazil’s non-punitive approach to irregular migration is so surprising. 
That said, some number of migrants do end up in Brazil’s increasingly punitive 
criminal justice system.  According to recent statistics, approximately 3,200 
foreigners are housed in the Brazilian prison system, representing less than 1 percent 
of the overall prison population in Brazil.154  The overwhelming majority of these 
persons have been convicted of drug-related offenses.155  According to the Federal 
Public Defender’s office, approximately 90 percent of these prisoners are drug 
“mules,” typically persons who had transported illegal drugs.156  Many of these 
prisoners were likely sentenced pursuant to the 2006 Lei de Drogas, which enhanced 
penalties for drug trafficking, increasing sentences to five to fifteen years.157  In this 
context, some migrants are impacted by policies of criminalization, though not 
necessarily because of their immigration status.  Although there are also some 
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reports of cases where Federal Police officers have targeted migrants for selective 
policing, these reports tend to be episodic in nature.158 
Although immigrants in Brazil have been linked to drug trafficking, there is not 
widespread preoccupation about their dangerousness to the community, nor is there 
urgency regarding removing these individuals once they have served their sentence.  
Indeed, some of these prisoners—particularly those who had been granted parole 
before the official end of their sentence—find themselves in a legal limbo, lacking 
legal status, but waiting (sometimes years) for the formal expulsion process to run 
its course.159  In general, discourses relating to public security in Brazil do not 
foreground threats posed by foreigners.160  This stands in contrast to the experience 
in other countries, where growing societal preoccupation about criminality has 
coincided with concerns regarding specific migrant groups.161 
External observers might offer another reason for the existing criminal justice 
priorities in Brazil: the country, unlike the United States and some in Europe, has 
not yet experienced a major foreign terrorist event.162  Such an event might pierce 
the public consciousness, linking migration policy with national security, and 
thereby result in more aggressive border control and criminalization.  This line of 
thinking, while logical, ignores the historical and present-day circumstances of 
Brazil.163  First, concerns about international terrorism have weighed heavily in 
recent years, as Brazil has hosted two major international sporting events: the World 
Cup (2014) and the Summer Olympic Games (2016).  For both of these events, 
Brazil prepared for the possibility of terrorist activity.164  Although both events 
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occurred without incident, the Brazilian state—and its society—has felt the weight 
of a possible terrorist incident, such that in 2016 the Brazilian Congress passed a 
new law to prevent and combat terrorism.165 
Moreover, concerns about terrorist activity and religious extremism do feature 
in Brazilian political discourse.  Conservative media outlets have reported on 
Federal Police investigations of Brazilian nationals suspected of connections to 
extremist groups.166  Additionally, in recent years, as the country has contemplated 
changes to its criminal and immigration laws, groups within Brazilian society have 
warned of the dangers posed by foreigners, including the possible influence of 
Islamic extremism.  Although such views are not widespread, Brazilian society has 
been forced to engage with these questions, at least on some level.167  In other words, 
Brazilian government officials have contemplated the possibility of terrorist attacks, 
but have not opted for repressive immigration controls as a counter-terrorism tool. 
Finally, as a practical matter, immigration-related functions are just a sliver of 
the broad mandate of the Federal Police.168  Some observers have suggested that the 
agency simply does not have the capacity to properly handle immigration matters, 
given their focus on drug and wildlife trafficking, smuggling, and white-collar 
crime.169  High-level Federal Police officials have even suggested that the agency be 
relieved of administrative policing functions, including those relating to 
migration.170  Along these lines, in recent years, the Federal Police has subcontracted 
immigration screening functions at airports to a third party, prompting criticism from 
observers about lack of training and oversight of workers.171  The resources of the 
Federal Police are indeed limited, and would be inefficiently allocated in patrolling 
the country’s 15,000 kilometers of borders, given all of the other demands on the 
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agency.172  Additionally, the agency has experienced budget reductions in recent 
years, as the Brazilian government as a whole struggles through a fiscal crisis.173 
 
IV. THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL-IMMIGRATION INTERSECTIONS IN BRAZIL 
 
Demographic, historical, geopolitical, and policy considerations have likely 
shaped, to varying degrees, the current policies in Brazil relating to the 
criminalization of migrants.  The immigrant-friendly policies of the Brazilian state 
are commendable, but may shield other concerns, and may ultimately prove to be 
ephemeral.  Other analytical lenses suggest that while migration itself is not 
criminalized, the Brazilian state has generated hardships for migrants, through both 
acts and omissions.  Furthermore, conditions in the future may change the trajectory 
of Brazil’s migration policy. 
One immediate concern is the volatile political climate in Brazil in the 
aftermath of the 2018 Presidential election.  As of this writing, Jair Bolsonaro, often 
described as a Trump-like figure, is poised to assume the presidency after prevailing 
in the October 2018 election.174  Bolsonaro was one of the few Senators to openly 
criticize the new Migration Law, tweeting in April 2017 that the legislation “could 
bring chaos to Brazil.”175  Migration policy under a Bolsonaro presidency would 
likely shift, but the nature and scope of any change remains quite uncertain.  
Although a repeal of the May 2017 law would require an act of Congress, the new 
administration could simply choose not to fully implement the law. 
A related concern is the persistence of the migration flows from Venezuela, 
which have contributed to conflicts in border areas, and ongoing discussions about 
Brazil’s international obligations.  In August 2018, after an alleged scuffle between 
a local merchant and some Venezuelans, a group of residents in the state of Roraima 
attacked and set fire to migrant encampments, driving more than 1,000 Venezuelans 
back across the border.176  On the whole, the Brazilian public generally favors the 
protection of Venezuelans, but not overwhelmingly so: a recent public opinion poll 
revealed that 45 percent of Brazilians oppose closing the borders, 30 percent favor 
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the move, and 25 percent have no opinion.177  Bolsonaro has called for the creation 
of refugee camps in border areas, emphasizing that Brazil cannot be an open-borders 
country.178  The shifting political winds in Brazil, in combination with the increasing 
strain of the Venezuela crisis, may shape Brazil’s migration policies in unpredictable 
ways. 
Another area for concern is the growing influence of the private prison industry 
in Brazil.  Historically, prisons in Brazil have been government-run, but recent 
events—including a spate of prison riots—have raised questions about the 
government’s ability to effectively manage the prison system.  And indeed, a handful 
of Brazilian states have entered into contracts with private prison companies.179  As 
the United States’ experience clearly demonstrates, the need to maintain revenues 
for private prison corporations contributes to efforts to further criminalize 
migrants.180  Indeed, it is telling that the vast majority of individuals who are 
prosecuted under Operation Streamline are incarcerated in private detention 
facilities.181  Should private prisons continue to grow in number and influence in 
Brazil, there may be a spillover effect on immigration policy and criminalization.  
This trend is worthy of continued monitoring. 
Moreover, although Brazil may have chosen to reject the explicit rhetoric of 
criminalization, the state is arguably deploying other approaches to exert control 
over migrants.  These devices also limit the ability of migrants to enjoy productive, 
autonomous lives.  Even in the absence of direct physical control, the state can assert 
its power in indirect ways.  This lens of analysis allows us to see the quintessential 
criminal-immigration intersections as part of a broader continuum of state 
practices.182 
Notwithstanding the promising language in the new law, and the generally low 
enforcement of immigration-related crimes, law enforcement activities in Brazil 
have come under some scrutiny.  During the Ebola epidemic, reports surfaced of 
African migrants in Brazil experiencing abusive treatment and discrimination by law 
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enforcement.183  Another example comes from 2016, after Venezuelan migrants 
crossed the border into Brazil seeking refuge, and began to cluster in the northern 
Brazilian state of Roraima.  In late 2016, in an incident that garnered significant 
public attention, federal police officers nearly deported approximately 450 of these 
Venezuelans, including individuals who had presented formal refugee claims.184  
Fortunately, intervention by the Brazilian courts prevented these deportations from 
taking place.185  Along these lines, observers have also criticized the treatment of 
asylum-seekers who arrive at Guarulhos International Airport in São Paulo, 
including the fact that they are sometimes detained in an ad hoc fashion for indefinite 
periods of time.186  The aforementioned prosecution of drug mules is another way 
that the state exerts control over noncitizens.187 
Another way in which noncitizens in Brazil experience mistreatment is 
arguably through the perpetuation of their economic vulnerability.  As noted above 
in the context of Haitians, in recent years, the National Council of Immigration in 
Brazil has issued resolutions that have regularized thousands of migrants who were 
residing in Brazil without formal legal status.  The Council is a unique body, housed 
within the Executive Branch, but comprised of representatives of different federal 
ministries, as well as members of civil society (including non-profits and unions).188  
The very language of the Council resolutions reveal that they passed on the heels of 
strong lobbying from employers and industries that had hired these immigrant 
workers.189  These businesses argued that their industries depended on the migrant 
workforce.  Therefore, the justification for their regularization of status was to allow 
them to continue supporting these industries.190  Although the newly acquired 
immigration status did not require employment with a specific company, in practice, 
many of these migrants may find themselves depending on employers to navigate 
complex immigration process or for different types of social support. 
Ironically, the Brazilian state has also enhanced the vulnerability of the 
migrants through negligence of their post-arrival needs.  One of the most consistent 
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critiques of Brazilian migration policy is the lack of efforts by the federal 
government to assist migrants with access to services and with their general 
integration into Brazilian society.191  In other words, while Brazil has adopted 
welcoming immigration policies, it has failed to pair those policies with the 
infrastructure needed to support the arriving migrants.192  By failing to provide these 
support services, the Brazilian state has placed migrants in circumstances of extreme 
precarity, rendering them vulnerable to exploitation and preventing them from living 
full and independent lives. 
Along these lines, although Brazil has championed human rights principles in 
public fora and through its progressive new immigration law, observers have 
emphasized the “contrast between Brazil’s formal commitment to liberal democratic 
norms and the violation of the basic rights of so many of its citizens.”193  In other 
words, while the government may embrace progressive principles through its 
rhetoric and written legislation, the reality on the ground suggests contrary behavior, 
or at a minimum, that the progressive norms have not trickled down to the level of 
public officials who actually implement the law.194 
Even accounting for these complexities, Brazil is at a unique historical moment, 
with a recent history of inclusive immigration policies, now punctuated by a new 
immigration law.  Developments in the coming months and years will determine 
whether the policy of embracing migration (and rejecting criminalization of 
migration) is illusory, or whether it represents a permanent normative shift in 
country-level migration policy.  Several factors will help determine the integrity of 
this position, including the following: (1) whether Brazil chooses to develop a solid 
infrastructure for immigrant integration, to buttress its welcoming rhetoric; (2) 
whether the new policies embraced by Brazil are adopted by other countries, 
particularly in South America; (3) whether support for this approach will remain 
strong after the 2018 election, or whether a Bolsonaro presidency will stall or even 
reverse the progressive turn in Brazilian migration policy; (4) whether significantly 
elevated migrant flows, including a steady stream of arrivals from Venezuela, along 
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with other poor migrants of diverse backgrounds, will generate heightened tensions 
about migrants and their impact on Brazilian society; (5) whether pathologies in its 
criminal justice system will undermine the benevolent posture towards receiving 
migrants; and (6) whether relevant government actors, particularly the Federal 
Police, embrace these norms. 
Ultimately, many of these factors could be explored and addressed through a 
cohesive migration policy that is developed at the government level, in collaboration 
with local entities and also foreign powers.  To its credit, Brazil has contemplated 
such a dialogue, and describes the contours for future policy development in its May 
2017 law.195  Additionally, in November 2017, the Brazilian government issued 
implementing regulations for the law.196  While the regulations are extensive, 
observers have criticized specific provisions for their inconsistency with the letter 
and spirit of the law.197  Discussions regarding the law’s implementation, including 
the regulations, will undoubtedly continue in the months and years to come. 
For Brazil’s policies to persist, its government and society must be able to resist 
the narrative that equates foreigners with dangerousness and criminality, and 
continue to advance one that views the reception of migrants as a basic obligation 
of states.  Unique historical and positional factors in Brazil may indeed allow Brazil 
to retain its relatively benevolent posture towards immigrants.  And if this approach 
succeeds, over time, it may emerge as a lasting and effective counterpoint in global 
discourses regarding migration. 
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